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THE ENTREPRENEURIAL COMMONS:  
REFRAMING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
 
Michael J. Burstein* 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
I begin with two stories about intellectual property and entrepreneurship. The 
first takes place at the birth of modern communications. Alexander Graham Bell is 
credited most frequently with the invention of the telephone.1 At the very least, he 
was the pioneering force behind its commercialization and widespread adoption. But 
he faced a significant enemy in Western Union, the nation’s leading telegraph 
company, whose business model was threatened fundamentally by voice 
communication over wire. The Bell Company “was little more than a typically 
hopeless start-up,” 2  while Western Union “brought overwhelming advantages: 
capital, an existing nationwide network of wires, and a close relationship with 
newspapers, hotels, and politicians.” 3  Western Union entered the market for 
telephone service with significant force, hoping to consign the fledging Bell 
Company to niche status or force them to sell.4 Bell fought back with the only 
weapon in its arsenal: a patent on the critical technology. Bell filed an infringement 
suit against Western Union in 1878, leading to one of the most significant patent 
                                                
* © 2016 Michael J. Burstein. Vice Dean and Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo 
School of Law, Yeshiva University. Many thanks to John Coyle, Victor Fleischer, Brett 
Frischmann, Michael Guttentag, Orly Lobel, Ted Sichelman, and Amelia Rinehart for their 
helpful comments. I am also grateful to participants in the 2015 Utah Law Review 
Symposium and the 2016 Law & Entrepreneurship Association Annual Retreat for 
discussion of the ideas presented here. 
1 This statement is the subject of great debate and much historical scholarship. There 
were several parties working on telephone technology at roughly the same time. See, e.g., 
Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REV. 709, 720–22 (2012) 
(summarizing competing claims of inventorship). Although Bell prevailed as a legal matter 
with respect to the most important patent to cover the technology, other inventors have just 
as good if not better claims to be the actual inventors of the telephone. See CHRISTOPHER 
BEAUCHAMP, INVENTED BY LAW: ALEXANDER GRAHAM BELL AND THE PATENT THAT 
CHANGED AMERICA 3–5 (2015). 
2 TIM WU, THE MASTER SWITCH: THE RISE AND FALL OF INFORMATION EMPIRES 17 
(2010). The company that bore Bell’s name eventually came to be a government-sanctioned 
monopoly itself, and was the sole provider of telephone service nationwide until its breakup 
in 1984. Id. at 17. 
3 Id. at 26. 
4 See id. at 25–27. 
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cases of the era.5 Bell emerged victorious, with his patent valid and infringed, and a 
settlement that kept Western Union out of the telephone business.6 
The second story takes place over one hundred years later, as that same 
technology neared its demise. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, internet technology 
had become sufficiently well-developed that it posed a disruptive threat to providers 
of traditional telephone services. Companies like Vonage offered consumers low-
priced telephone service that utilized the packet-switched internet to transmit calls 
to and from traditional phone lines, rather than relying solely upon the wireline 
incumbent phone companies.7  This situation mirrored the start of the telephone 
industry, but with the places reversed. The descendants of the Bell Company were 
the monopolists, and Vonage was the startup that threatened to undermine their core 
business model with new technology. And there was another crucial difference: this 
time, the important patents were in the hands of the incumbents, who deployed them 
in litigation against the startup. 8  Sprint, Verizon, and AT&T each extracted 
settlements from Vonage totaling around $200 million, “which was about one 
quarter of Vonage’s annual revenue at the time.”9 As a result, “Vonage’s marketing 
expenditures decreased, and its subscriber growth slowed substantially. Indeed, 
Vonage was almost delisted from the New York Stock Exchange, and some 
observers predicted bankruptcy.”10 
These two stories may prompt opposite conclusions about the relationship 
between patents and entrepreneurship. The first story demonstrates, as Tim Wu puts 
it, that “in the hands of an outside inventor, a patent serves . . . as [a] sort of corporate 
shield that can prevent a large industrial power from killing you off or seizing control 
of your company and the industry.” In this view, patents help “sow the seeds of 
creative destruction.”11 The second story, on the other hand, is, in Ted Sichelman’s 
words, one of “patent bullies,” who “assert their patents against entrants to prevent 
innovative, disruptive technologies from competing with the bullies’ outmoded 
products,”12 and thereby stifle rather than promote innovation. 
It is easy to draw from these competing stories the conclusion that the 
relationship between patents and entrepreneurship simply depends on context. It 
depends on the relative competitive positioning of startups and incumbents; on the 
nature of the technology that the startup is seeking to commercialize; on the structure 
                                                
5 See BEAUCHAMP, supra note 1, at 54–56. 
6 See WU, supra note 2, at 30–31. To be fair, the settlement was possible not only 
because of Bell’s success in litigation, including in the Supreme Court of the United States, 
but also because of intervening business events. See id.  
7 See Ted Sichelman, The Vonage Trilogy: A Case Study in “Patent Bullying,” 90 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 543, 554–56 (2014) (describing the founding and early history of 
Vonage). 
8 See id. at 551–52 (discussing the patent lawsuit brought by Sprint, Verizon, and 
AT&T against Vonage).  
9 Id. at 573 (citations omitted). 
10 Id. 
11 WU, supra note 2, at 30. 
12 Sichelman, supra note 7, at 549–50. 
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and function of the entrepreneurial community, including other companies and 
sources of financing, of which the startup is part. But “it depends” is hardly a 
satisfying explanation of the relationship between IP and entrepreneurship; the 
question “on what?” follows naturally and inevitably.  
The existing literature on patenting and entrepreneurship13 that tries to answer 
that question incorporates two assumptions. First, it takes the existing arrangement 
of patent rights and institutions as a given and asks how that arrangement affects 
startup companies. Second, it sees startups as atomistic, individual enterprises. To 
be sure, this literature has produced interesting and useful results that have helped 
advance our understanding of the ways in which startups respond to and interact 
with the current patent laws. But it is unlikely to provide a satisfactory explanation, 
to take one example, for the divergent experiences of Bell and his latter-day internet-
based successors. To fully explain why patents seem to work differently in different 
settings, we need a more systematic understanding of the roles that IP plays within 
and among entrepreneurs, startup companies, sources of funding, and the larger 
business and innovation ecosystems of which they are a part. And to interrogate 
whether our current IP laws are working in a way that best promotes and facilitates 
entrepreneurship and capital formation, we need to think of intellectual property 
laws not as a set of external constraints, but rather as endogenous tools for 
accomplishing particular goals. 
This Article therefore offers a different conceptual and methodological 
framework for investigating the links between intellectual property and 
entrepreneurship. Rather than starting with the existing IP regime as a baseline and 
asking how entrepreneurial ventures behave with respect to that regime, this Article 
proposes starting with entrepreneurial activity and identifying how and why 
intellectual property might play a supporting role. My account of entrepreneurship 
places the generation and sharing of information at its center.14 It posits that ideas 
and their implementation are the primary source of value for entrepreneurs. 15 
Entrepreneurship in this view is the process by which individuals and firms generate, 
produce, and disseminate innovations in business and technology.16 Entrepreneurs 
begin with an idea, they secure funding to develop that idea, and they figure out how 
to commercialize the idea and build a business from it. These intertwined processes 
all take place in an environment in which entrepreneurs do not act alone. They 
                                                
13 Of course, other forms of intellectual property are deeply important to the 
entrepreneurial process. Copyright looms large in the creative industries, and all firms rely 
upon trademarks as critical components of their branding strategies. Nevertheless, this 
Article focuses on patents and technology-based startups. 
14 A note on terminology: This Article uses the word “sharing” not in an altruistic sense, 
but in the sense of exchange. 
15  See, e.g., D. Gordon Smith & Darian M. Ibrahim, Law and Entrepreneurial 
Opportunities, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1533, 1535 (2013) (“We adopt the widely held view that 
entrepreneurial opportunities are ideas created by entrepreneurs, rather than resources 
waiting to be discovered.”). 
16 See infra Part III.C. 
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interact all of the time with funders, business partners, and competitors, often, 
though not always, in geographically distinct clusters.17 
To study systematically these intertwined processes, I borrow from the 
literature on governance of knowledge commons. A knowledge commons is a form 
of “institutionalized community governance of the sharing and . . . creation of 
knowledge, data, and other types of intellectual and cultural resources.”18 Some 
well-understood examples of knowledge commons include patent pools, open-
source software projects, and Wikipedia. 19  These arrangements share several 
common (no pun intended) characteristics. Each involves the coordinated sharing of 
critical information resources. Each has institutionalized mechanisms for governing 
that sharing. And each relies on a mix of formal and informal rules and norms—
including, sometimes and in complex ways, intellectual property—to support those 
mechanisms. 
Borrowing and adapting concepts and methodologies from Elinor Ostrom’s 
pioneering studies of natural resource commons, 20  the knowledge commons 
framework makes two contributions to our understanding of the role of intellectual 
property in information production. First, as a substantive matter, it focuses the 
analysis of information production and dissemination on context and complexity. 
Second, as a methodological matter, it focuses on deep analysis of case studies to 
shed light on that context and complexity in intellectual and cultural production. 
The bulk of this Article further adapts the knowledge commons framework to 
the study of entrepreneurship. I offer three key activities that entrepreneurs and their 
associated firms engage in—product development, competitive positioning, and 
fundraising—as examples of knowledge commons within the entrepreneurial 
ecosystem. 21  In each of these activities, there is a distinct, but sometimes 
overlapping set of actors. The relationships among those actors with respect to the 
production of new innovations all require some exchange or use of valuable 
information. Tracing the rules and practices that govern that use and exchange 
                                                
17  See, e.g., ANNALEE SAXENIAN, REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND 
COMPETITION IN SILICON VALLEY AND ROUTE 128, at 2–3 (1994). 
18  Brett M. Frischmann et al., Governing Knowledge Commons, in GOVERNING 
KNOWLEDGE COMMONS 1, 3 (Brett M. Frischmann et al., eds., 2014). 
19  Brett M. Frischmann, Two Enduring Lessons from Elinor Ostrom, 9 J. 
INSTITUTIONAL ECON. 387, 402 (2013). 
20  See, e.g., ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF 
INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 1–2 (1990) (describing the problems associated with 
governing and managing natural resource systems). 
21 These three business functions are meant as examples and not a comprehensive list 
of the entrepreneurial activities that might be modeled as knowledge commons. Other such 
activities might include marketing, pricing, manufacturing, quality control, and so forth. My 
argument here is limited to “proof of concept”—I use these three examples to demonstrate 
the analytic power of the knowledge commons framework applied to entrepreneurship, but 
not to explore its reach. 
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should yield valuable insights into the roles that intellectual property might play in 
the entrepreneurship process.22 
The argument proceeds as follows. Part II reviews the existing literature on IP 
and entrepreneurship to demonstrate the existence of significant gaps in our 
understanding of that relationship. Part III then articulates a framework for 
systematic analysis of those gaps. It explains that commons governance is a part of 
numerous entrepreneurial activities, and focuses attention on two aspects of 
entrepreneurship that are mostly overlooked in the legal literature: information 
exchange and collaboration. Part IV concludes with some notes on methodology and 
proposals for further research. 
 
II.  EXISTING STUDIES OF PATENTING AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
 
Most existing studies of the relationship between intellectual property and 
entrepreneurship focus on the effects of various IP laws on entrepreneurial behavior. 
They focus, in other words, on how startups utilize and encounter the existing 
arrangement of IP laws. To be sure, this approach offers some valuable insights, but 
it does not provide a complete picture of the ways in which intellectual property and 
entrepreneurship interact.  
One line of inquiry asks why entrepreneurs choose to patent (or not to patent) 
their inventions. The classic economic justification for patents is that they offer an 
ex ante incentive to invent by providing the exclusivity needed for inventors to 
recoup their investments in otherwise freely appropriable research and 
development.23 But the evidence that the prospect of a patent encourages invention 
that would not otherwise have been undertaken is notoriously weak, among both 
startups24 and established companies.25 The facts that “the average expected value 
                                                
22 The “commons” terminology and methodology has not previously been applied to 
the study of entrepreneurship in the legal literature. Management scholars, on the other hand, 
have started to use the framework. See, e.g., Sonali K. Shah & Cyrus C.M. Mody, Creating 
a Context for Entrepreneurship: Examining How Users’ Technological and Organizational 
Innovations Set the Stage for Entrepreneurial Activity, in GOVERNING KNOWLEDGE 
COMMONS 313, 313 (Brett M. Frischmann et al. eds., 2014). 
23  See Peter S. Menell & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property Law, in 2 
HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 1473, 1476–78 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven 
Shavell eds., 2007). 
24  See Stuart J.H. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent 
System: Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255, 1283–
87 (2009). To be fair, this finding is somewhat industry specific, as discussed in more detail 
below. See id. at 1286; infra text accompanying notes 35–38. 
25 See, e.g., Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research 
and Development, 3 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 783, 795 (1987) (“Firms may 
sometimes refrain from patenting processes to avoid disclosing either the fact or the details 
of an innovation.”); Wesley M. Cohen et al., Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: 
Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not) 2–3 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7552, 2000), http://www.nber.org/papers/ 
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of a patent is extremely small . . . [,] the overwhelming majority of patents have no 
value whatsoever, and of those that have value, it is nearly impossible to determine 
ex ante,”26 give rise to what some call a “patent paradox”:27 if patents provide little 
incentive, why do companies patent? A range of answers has been offered: patents 
may be useful for maintaining super-competitive prices, as means for specializing 
across the innovation value chain and generating licensing revenues, developing an 
arsenal for cross-licensing, securing investment and financing, as assets in 
bankruptcy, as means to block others from patenting or to block others from 
effectively using their own patented technology, and for public relations or 
improving a firm’s image.28 
The most comprehensive recent effort to examine empirically the relationship 
between IP and entrepreneurship is the Berkeley Patent Survey. 29  That study 
surveyed 1,332 early-stage technology companies on a range of issues related to 
patenting and entrepreneurship.30 It found that startup companies patent for a wide 
variety of reasons and that there is much nuance and context-specificity in those 
reasons.31 Most basically, for example, it found that patent holdings among startup 
companies vary by industry, with biotechnology and medical device companies 
much more likely to hold patents and to hold more of them than software or internet 
firms.32 This industry differentiation held true across the range of findings in the 
study.33 
With respect to the reasons why startups patent, the study found that preventing 
others from copying one’s invention is the primary driver of startup patenting.34 But 
firms use multiple appropriation strategies to realize value from their investments in 
research and development (“R&D”), 35  and the extent to which patents are an 
important part of those strategies varies with both the industry and the specific 
technology at issue. For example, biotech companies collectively ranked patenting 
                                                
w7552.pdf [https://perma.cc/F6Y6-P2JY] (discussing prevalence of patents and other 
appropriation mechanisms among manufacturers).  
26 Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 
5 (2005). 
27 Id. 
28 For a comprehensive review, see Stuart J.H. Graham & Ted Sichelman, Why Do 
Start-Ups Patent?, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1063, 1071–82 (2008). 
29 See Graham et al., supra note 24, at 1255; see also Ted Sichelman & Stuart J.H. 
Graham, Patenting by Entrepreneurs: An Empirical Study, 17 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. 
L. REV. 111 (2010). 
30 Graham et al., supra note 24, at 1255. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 1278–79. 
33 Id. at 1278–83. 
34 See id. at 1297; see also Sichelman & Graham, supra note 29, at 153. 
35 See Graham et al., supra note 24, at 1289–90 & fig.1; see also David J. Teece, 
Profiting from Technological Innovation: Implications for Integration, Collaboration, 
Licensing and Public Policy, 15 RES. POL’Y 285, 287 (1986) (discussing the costs and 
benefits of first-mover advantage and ownership of complementary assets). 
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as their most important appropriation strategy;36 IT hardware firms and medical 
device startups ranked patenting second behind first-mover advantage; 37  and 
venture-backed IT hardware firms ranked patenting as important as secrecy in 
capturing the returns from R&D.38 These appropriability strategies also can vary 
with the type of innovation at issue. The study found that “patenting is almost twice 
as important for product innovators than for process innovators.”39 
Patents also may be thought to play a role in product development, particularly 
for startups that lack the capital to scale up their technological developments for 
manufacturing and commercialization. In theory, patenting might help to enable the 
exchange of technological information without fear of appropriation before 
payment.40 A literature on “markets for technology” takes this view, and emphasizes 
the importance of a patent to the broader process of information exchange that 
accompanies research and development partnerships.41 A corollary is that patenting 
facilitates the development of specialized business models based on licensing out 
technologies.42 Survey data suggests that this view too is complicated. The startups 
surveyed in the Berkeley Patent Survey, for example, collectively ranked 
“obtain[ing] licensing revenues” as one of the least important reasons for securing a 
patent, which “might seem to conflict with the markets-for-technology view that 
small firms are more likely to license their patents because vertical specialization 
allows these firms to operate in upstream technology markets and provide 
technology inputs to (generally large) firms operating in downstream product 
markets.”43 At the same time, however, the authors find support for “the view that 
the smallest of startup firms rely more on patenting for licensing than larger firms,”44 
and that biotechnology firms generally place a greater emphasis on licensing than 
firms in other industries.45 But even the biotech story is more complicated. Although 
                                                
36 See Graham et al., supra note 24, at 1290–91. 
37 See id. at 1291. “First mover advantage” allows firms to reap super-competitive 
returns on their investments in R&D during the time that they have the market to themselves 
before competitive imitation. See, e.g., Teece, supra note 35, at 287. 
38 See Graham et al., supra note 24, at 1292. 
39 Id. at 1293. 
40 This is known in the literature as the disclosure paradox. See Kenneth J. Arrow, 
Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE RATE AND 
DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 615 (Nat’l 
Bureau Comm. for Econ. Research & Comm. on Econ. Growth of the Soc. Sci. Research 
Council eds., 1962). Consistent with the argument advanced in this Article, in previous work 
I argued that intellectual property is not the necessary or sole mechanism for solving this 
paradox. See Michael J. Burstein, Exchanging Information Without Intellectual Property, 91 
TEX. L. REV. 227, 228 (2012). 
41 See, e.g., ASHISH ARORA ET AL., MARKETS FOR TECHNOLOGY: THE ECONOMICS OF 
INNOVATION AND CORPORATE STRATEGY 1 (2001). 
42 See, e.g., Ashish Arora & Robert P. Merges, Specialized Supply Firms, Property 
Rights and Firm Boundaries, 13 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 451, 452 (2004). 
43 Graham et al., supra note 24, at 1301–02. 
44 Id. at 1302. 
45 Id. at 1303; Sichelman & Graham, supra note 29, at 164. 
618 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 4 
it is “well-documented that . . . biotechnology startups typically form alliances with 
incumbents to clear costly regulatory hurdles and bring their innovations to 
market,”46 biotech firms cited a reluctance to disclose the information necessary to 
secure a patent as their primary reason for forgoing patent protection.47  
Finally, patents appear to play a role in securing entrepreneurial financing, but 
the existing evidence sheds little light on the nature of that role. There is a fair 
amount of evidence that different sources of entrepreneurial finance—most notably 
venture capital, but also sources of debt financing—find patents valuable in making 
their investment decisions. Three-quarters of venture-backed respondents in the 
Berkeley Patent Survey reported that a potential funding source with whom they 
negotiated “indicated that having patents was important to their funding decision.”48 
This finding is consistent with econometric studies that have shown that more 
intensive patenting by startups in the software and biotechnology sectors is 
associated with greater total investment and number of financing rounds,49 and with 
recent work drawing a similar correlation between patents and venture lending.50 
But although the correlation appears clear, causation is much murkier. One 
suggestion is that patents serve as signals to financing sources, either of the quality 
of the underlying technology or of the management team and its strategic 
positioning.51 Alternatively, patents may help startups secure freedom to operate, 
thereby making their business models more attractive to investors;52 or they could 
serve as assets in bankruptcy53 or as collateral.54 Survey data generally cannot sort 
out these competing explanations. 55  While some qualitative work suggests that 
patents are unlikely to be the driving force behind financing in the software 
industry,56 more systematic investigation is needed. 
A distinct line of inquiry asks how startups encounter the patent system other 
than through their own patenting activities. How, in other words, does the patent 
system affect startups more broadly? One point of contact separate and apart from a 
firm’s own patenting is its licensing of others’ patents. Licensing generally can be 
                                                
46 Sichelman & Graham, supra note 29, at 164. 
47 See Graham et al., supra note 24, at 1313. 
48 Id. at 1307. 
49 For an overview of this literature, see Sichelman & Graham, supra note 29, at 122–
23 & nn.54–56. 
50 See Yael V. Hochberg et al., Patent Collateral, Investor Commitment, and the Market 
for Venture Lending 1, 9–11 (Aug. 10, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.econ. 
upf.edu/~cserrano/papers/HSZ_paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/KGD5-74PK]. 
51 See, e.g., David H. Hsu & Rosemarie H. Ziedonis, Resources As Dual Sources of 
Advantage: Implications for Valuing Entrepreneurial-Firm Patents, 34 STRATEGIC MGMT. 
J. 761, 761–62 (2013); Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 627–28 (2002). 
52 See Graham et al., supra note 24, at 1306. 
53 See id. at 1306–07. 
54 See Hochberg et al., supra note 50, at 2–4. 
55 See Graham et al., supra note 24, at 1307. 
56 See Ronald J. Mann, Do Patents Facilitate Financing in the Software Industry?, 83 
TEX. L. REV. 961, 963–68 (2005).  
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ex ante, that is, “before the purchaser has obtained the technology through other 
means,”57 or ex post, in which the license is executed “after a firm has invested in 
creating, developing or commercializing the patented technology.”58 The former are 
generally associated with technology transfer—the exchange of useful technological 
information mediated in some cases by the exchange of a patent embodying at least 
part of that information.59 The latter has come to be associated with the behavior of 
patent assertion entities (or “patent trolls”) whose business models depend solely on 
licensing patents, but it more properly refers to enforcement activities by any patent-
holding entity.60 Putting aside a vigorous debate in the academic literature about 
whether ex post licensing activity is socially valuable, these two types of licensing 
present quite different opportunities and challenges for startup companies. 
Existing studies have focused on determining which mode of licensing is more 
common. The Berkeley Patent Survey found evidence of both kinds of activity, with 
some significant industry differentiation—biotechnology firms appear more 
frequently than venture-backed IT firms to take a license at least in part for the 
purpose of gaining access to knowledge.61  More recent (but somewhat limited) 
survey data suggests that across the range of industries an increasing number of 
licensing demands, whether from practicing or nonpracticing entities, are ex post 
rather than ex ante.62 Approaching the issues from the opposite direction, Colleen 
Chien finds that the activities of patent trolls are disproportionately directed at 
startup companies because such companies are more likely to pay nuisance 
settlements than established companies with deeper pockets.63 
The existing literature on patenting and entrepreneurship described above 
yields two important conclusions. The first is that the relationship between the patent 
system and entrepreneurial activity is complex and multifaceted. Patents influence 
many aspects of startup behavior in many different ways. The second is that this 
relationship is highly context-dependent; it depends on industry, firm structure, and 
technology. But this literature ultimately raises more questions than it answers. It 
offers little of the rich contextual detail needed to understand the complexity that it 
suggests. In part this is likely due to methodological limitations. Survey data in 
particular is useful in providing insights into trends and big-picture assessments, but 
necessarily loses detail. This methodology also expressly takes the existing 
arrangement of the patent system as a given. To the extent that policy prescriptions 
follow from its conclusions, they tend to be focused on adjustments to the existing 
system and ignore its alternatives. 
                                                
57 FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE 
AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 40 (2011). 
58 Id. at 50. 
59 See id. at 7–8. 
60 See id. at 8–9.  
61 See Graham et al., supra note 24, at 1317–18. 
62  See Robin Feldman & Mark A. Lemley, Do Patent Licensing Demands Mean 
Innovation?, 101 IOWA L. REV. 137, 156–66 (2015). 
63 See Colleen Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 461, 485–86 
(2014). 
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In the following Parts, this Article proposes a shift in the way that we conceive 
of the relationship between intellectual property and entrepreneurship as both a 
substantive and methodological matter.  
 
III.  FROM RESOURCE TO KNOWLEDGE TO ENTREPRENEURIAL COMMONS 
 
In the following sections, I reconceptualize the relationship between 
intellectual property and entrepreneurship as a kind of knowledge commons. In so 
doing, I seek to shift the focus of analysis from startups’ reactions to the existing 
patent system to startups’ behavior with respect to the information resources that 
form critical parts of their businesses. This enables us to widen the lens and examine 
intellectual property as one of a number of tools used to implement and sustain 
certain functional relationships, rather than as an exogenously defined set of rules. 
It also focuses attention on those relationships within communities rather than on 
the actions of single firms. And it entails a shift in methodology toward case study 
research. 
The reconceptualization proceeds in three steps. 
 
A.  Resource Commons 
 
In their pioneering work on commons-based resources, Elinor Ostrom and her 
collaborators explained the persistence of self-governing institutions that could 
manage natural resources in the absence of state-based property or regulatory 
regimes.64 Her examples of the management of “common pool resources” range 
from Spanish irrigation districts, to the lobster gangs of Maine, to Japanese fisheries. 
These (mostly) natural resources are of the type that we would ordinarily think 
subject to the “tragedy of the commons.” 65  They are too large to facilitate 
inexpensive exclusion, the resources are not subject to joint use, and improvement 
efforts are shared among all users.66 Individuals acting rationally according to their 
self-interest fail to exercise restraint in resource use, and the resource is depleted.67 
Prior to Ostrom’s work, conventional wisdom held that there were only two 
solutions to this problem: privatization through the assignment of property rights so 
that the rightsholder would see the full costs and benefits of her management 
                                                
64 See OSTROM, supra note 20, at 29–35; see also Yochai Benkler, Commons and 
Growth: The Essential Role of Open Commons in Market Economies, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1499, 1508 (2013) (book review) (distinguishing between state-based and cooperative 
“proprietary claims of exclusion, use, and disposition”). 
65 Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1244–45 (1968); see 
OSTROM, supra note 20, at 2–7 (describing the dynamic of resource overuse in a commons 
as a “tragedy of the commons,” a “prisoner’s dilemma,” and a problem of “collective 
action”). 
66 See OSTROM, supra note 20, at 30–31. 
67 See Hardin, supra note 65, at 1244–45. 
2016] ENTREPRENEURIAL COMMONS 621 
practices, on one hand;68 and government regulation to manage externalities, on the 
other.69 
Ostrom offered two seminal contributions.70 First, she found that collective 
action to manage common pool resources sustainably could and did in fact occur 
without either privatization or government regulation.71 The key to facilitating such 
collective action was the development of institutions— 
 
sets of working rules that are used to determine who is eligible to make 
decisions in some arena, what actions are allowed or constrained, what 
aggregation rules will be used, what procedures must be followed, what 
information must or must not be provided, and what payoffs will be 
assigned to individuals dependent on their actions.72  
 
The Spanish huerta irrigation districts could be sustained because of a detailed 
set of governance practices that were established and followed by the community 
even in the absence of formal law.73 These practices are necessarily highly context-
specific. They are tailored to the particular local conditions, geographies, and 
demographics. And they are facilitated through institutions that are intermediate 
between private property and the state.74 
This leads to Ostrom’s second contribution: a methodology for systematically 
studying natural resource commons, drawing commonalities and differences among 
them, and generalizing best and worst practices.75 Ostrom’s “institutional analysis 
and development” framework structures a common set of research questions to 
apply across diverse contexts so that information gleaned from individual case 
studies can be aggregated.76 
 
B.  Knowledge Commons 
 
In recent years, a number of scholars have demonstrated that Ostrom’s work 
can be adapted to study the production of information-based goods.77 Instead of the 
                                                
68 See OSTROM, supra note 20, at 12–13. 
69 See id. at 8–11. 
70 See Frischmann, supra note 19, at 388. 
71 Id. at 390–92. 
72 OSTROM, supra note 20, at 51. 
73 See id. at 69–82. 
74 See id. at 88–90. 
75 Frischmann, supra note 19, at 393. 
76 See ELINOR OSTROM, UNDERSTANDING INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY 13–15 (2005). 
77 See Michael J. Madison et al., Constructing Commons in the Cultural Environment, 
95 CORNELL L. REV. 657, 675–83 (2010). Elinor Ostrom and Charlotte Hess recognized the 
links between natural resource and information commons as well. See Charlotte Hess & 
Elinor Ostrom, Ideas, Artifacts, and Facilities: Information as a Common-Pool Resource, 
66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 111, 128–34 (2003). For an application, see, e.g., Timothy 
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tragedy of the commons, the problem to be overcome with respect to managing 
information resources is that of underproduction: the nonrivalrous and 
nonexcludable nature of information presents a disincentive to innovate because the 
fruits of investment in research and development can be taken by others freely.78 
And just as in the natural resources context, the conventional wisdom holds that this 
underproduction problem must be remedied either through privatization—in the 
form of intellectual property rights—or through government provision, like research 
grants.79 
Noting that “cultural production is an inherently social phenomenon, taking 
place over a wide range of scales and within a complex, overlapping variety of 
formal and informal institutional structures,” 80  Madison, Frischmann, and 
Strandburg posit that there are institutional structures intermediate between 
exclusive rights and government provision that allow for collective action to produce 
intellectual goods even in the face of the economic challenges described above.81 
Examples abound: patent pools, open-source software, Wikipedia, the Associated 
Press, jamband fan communities, and others.82 Each of these communities utilizes a 
set of institutional rules—sometimes intertwined with formal law, sometimes not—
to manage the production and dissemination of information. 
To be sure, Ostrom’s framework for research into collective action to manage 
natural resource communities does not map perfectly onto innovation environments. 
This is particularly so because such environments involve not only management of 
resources, but also the production of intellectual goods.83 Nevertheless, the analogy 
remains a good one. Collective action problems in the natural environment may lead 
to overuse of resources in the absence of a governance structure; so too in the cultural 
or innovative environment may collective action problems lead to 
underproduction.84 Barriers to collective action for the production of innovation can 
be lowered through governance mechanisms. 
To investigate systematically the nature of those governance structures, 
Frischmann et al. set forth a series of questions to answer about the relevant 
communities, actors, and activities. 85  Broadly speaking, they include questions 
about: the background environment, such as the legal context and the “default” role 
of intellectual property in respect of the resources to be produced; the various 
attributes of the community, including the characteristics of the resource sought to 
be produced and managed, the profiles of the relevant communities members and 
their varying roles, and the goals and objectives of the commons and its members; 
                                                
Simcoe, Governing the Anticommons: Institutional Design for Standard-Setting 
Organizations, 14 INNOVATION POL’Y & ECON. 99, 100 (2014). 
78 See Menell & Scotchmer, supra note 23, at 1476–77. 
79 See id. at 1477–79. 
80 Madison et al., supra note 77, at 669. 
81 See id. at 702–07. 
82 See Frischmann et al., supra note 18, at 3–6. 
83 See Madison et al., supra note 77, at 672, 680. 
84 See id. at 675, 691–92. 
85 See Frischmann et al., supra note 18, at 20–21. 
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the governance mechanisms, formal and informal, of the commons, including things 
like institutional and technological architectures, legal structures, and decision rules; 
and finally the patterns and outcomes of the commons including the benefits and 
costs to various members.86 
“Knowledge commons” is “shorthand for the institutionalized community 
governance of the sharing of and, in some cases, creation of information, science, 
knowledge, [or] data.”87 And the questions above help to develop nuanced data 
about the characteristics of knowledge commons. 
 
C.  The Entrepreneurial Commons 
 
Entrepreneurial activity often has the characteristics of a knowledge commons. 
Information production and management lies at the core of entrepreneurship. And 
the information that drives value for entrepreneurs must often be shared with 
others—development partners, funders, even competitors—in order for it to be 
useful.  
Most definitions of entrepreneurship require some element of novelty or 
innovation. Modern scholars of entrepreneurship define it in terms of the creation 
and exploitation of entrepreneurial opportunities, which in turn are novel or 
innovative business ideas.88 Joseph Schumpeter, often regarded as the father of the 
modern economics of entrepreneurship, defined five categories of entrepreneurial 
activity, all of which emphasized novelty: new goods; new methods of production; 
new geographical markets; new raw materials; and new ways of organizing.89 There 
is some debate in the literature about whether entrepreneurship requires innovation 
in the “strong sense” of new technologies that shake up established industries,90 or 
the “weak sense” of finding new business opportunities.91 But regardless of the sense 
in which “novelty” or “innovation” is used, it inevitably requires the generation of 
new information. This is most obvious in the case of new products. As described 
                                                
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 3. 
88  See, e.g., SCOTT SHANE, A GENERAL THEORY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP: THE 
INDIVIDUAL-OPPORTUNITY NEXUS 4 (2003) (“Entrepreneurship is an activity that involves 
the discovery, evaluation and exploitation of opportunities to introduce new goods and 
services, ways of organizing, markets, processes, and raw materials through organizing 
efforts that previously had not existed.”); Smith & Ibrahim, supra note 15, at 1540 (noting 
that Jonathan T. Eckhardt and Michael P. Ciuchta define entrepreneurship as “the discovery, 
evaluation, and exploitation of entrepreneurial opportunities” (quoting Jonathan T. Eckhardt 
& Michael P. Ciuchta, Selected Variation: The Population-Level Implications of Multistage 
Selection in Entrepreneurship, 2 STRATEGIC ENTREPRENEURSHIP J. 209, 209 (2008)).  
89  See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: AN 
INQUIRY INTO PROFITS, CAPITAL, CREDIT, INTEREST, AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE 66 (Redvers 
Opie trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1934). 
90 See Smith & Ibrahim, supra note 15, at 1541. This is Schumpeter’s conception of the 
entrepreneur. See SCHUMPETER, supra note 89, at 66. 
91 See Smith & Ibrahim, supra note 15, at 1542. 
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above, the patent system has long been premised on the idea that the invention and 
development of new products requires exclusive rights in the information that 
underlies them.92 Indeed, any new product can be conceived as the embodiment of 
the information required for its manufacture. 93  This is no less true of other 
entrepreneurial opportunities. New methods of production are also a combination of 
artifacts and information—the merger of capital equipment with processes and 
procedures. New ways of organizing or new business models are solely information-
based. They require implementation through the use of organizational forms and 
procedures, but the information required to carry them out often can be codified and 
transmitted. New markets are similarly founded upon information about the market 
opportunity; entry into a new market is valuable only so long as competitors remain 
unaware of the market opportunity. Consistent with the patent system’s focus on 
information, each of these entrepreneurial opportunities also has occasioned debate 
about whether intellectual property protection would result in the generation of more 
such opportunities.94 
Entrepreneurship requires not only the creation of information, but also its 
management. An idea for a new product may be a critical source of value, but it is 
not likely to become a commercialized product without communication and 
coordination among many parties. Information exchange is critical in at least three 
distinct but overlapping functions of entrepreneurial firms: product development, 
competitive strategy, and funding. In each of these functions, the successful 
management of information is essential to success. And in each of these functions, 
there is evidence that the role of intellectual property is ambiguous. It is only one of 
many strategies that firms employ to manage the information at their disposal.  
Of course, these three functions are iterative and overlap in complex ways. But 
it is useful as an initial matter to be clear about how they work independently, and 
then to investigate their interactions. 
 
1.  Product Development 
 
It has become common to observe that there is a difference between “invention” 
and “innovation,” between the conception of a new idea and its commercial 
development.95 The two usually require different skill sets. Conceiving a new idea 
or new product is different from developing a working prototype, scaling up 
                                                
92 See Menell & Scotchmer, supra note 23, at 1478–80. 
93  See 1 CARLISS Y. BALDWIN & KIM B. CLARK, DESIGN RULES: THE POWER OF 
MODULARITY 2 (2000) (drawing a distinction between “artifacts” and their information 
content). 
94 See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 648–56 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring) 
(business methods); Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, Intellectual Property for Market 
Experimentation, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 337, 338–45 (2008) (market feasibility tests). 
95 The distinction is usually attributed to Schumpeter. See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, 
CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 84 (2d ed. 1947). For discussion in the legal 
literature, see Burstein, supra note 40, at 237–41; Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 
62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 348–54 (2010) (describing the commercialization process). 
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production, market testing and marketing, distributing, and making follow-on 
improvements.96 In order to access those skill sets, inventors need to communicate 
their ideas to others. But doing so may be difficult or costly. For one thing, economic 
theory predicts that there will be high transaction costs to information exchange, 
mostly in the form of the “disclosure paradox” described above.97 For another, 
information often has characteristics that make it difficult to transfer—it may be 
tacit, for example, and therefore difficult to codify and share.98 
Entrepreneurial firms have a variety of strategies for overcoming these 
problems. Some of them rely on intellectual property—patents can both solve the 
disclosure paradox in some circumstances by making information excludable99 and 
can facilitate information codification and exchange.100 Others do not. Entrepreneurs 
in the biotech industry, for example, often rely upon the partial excludability of 
knowledge required to implement certain research tools to allow development 
partners and customers to gain sufficient knowledge to transact over the tools while 
simultaneously protecting against misappropriation.101 In software, strong norms of 
sharing emerge in some communities, sometimes backed up by IP- or contract-based 
restrictions on that sharing. In short, a complex set of tools can be brought to 
facilitate the exchange of knowledge required for product development. 
It is worth noting two additional wrinkles to this problem. First, firms also face 
and respond to information exchange problems internally. Even if a firm chooses 
not to go outside its boundaries to access particular skill sets in product development, 
it must still organize and manage information flows among its own employees.102 
The relationships among the firm’s owners and managers and its employees with 
respect to information are sometimes shaped by intellectual property,103 but more 
often shaped by internal practices, background rules and norms, and various legal 
rules governing trade secrets.104  
Second, product development often is iterative. It can require not only the 
transmission of information, but also the generation of new ideas and knowledge in 
response to the needs of the development process. Collaboratively doing so presents 
special governance challenges and requires innovative governance arrangements. 
Gilson, Sabel and Scott call such arrangements “contracts for innovation,” in which 
                                                
96 See Burstein, supra note 40, at 238. 
97 See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
98  See Burstein, supra note 40, at 251–54; Peter Lee, Transcending the Tacit 
Dimension: Patents, Relationships, and Organizational Integration in Technology Transfer, 
100 CALIF. L. REV. 1503, 1503–04 (2012). 
99 See Arrow, supra note 40, at 616–17. 
100 See Dan L. Burk, The Role of Patent Law in Knowledge Codification, 23 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1009, 1017–18 (2008). 
101 See Burstein, supra note 40, at 254–55. 
102 See Dan L. Burk & Brett H. McDonnell, The Goldilocks Hypothesis: Balancing 
Intellectual Property Rights at the Boundary of the Firm, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 575, 591–99. 
103 See id. 
104 See Orly Lobel, The New Cognitive Property: Human Capital Law and the Reach 
of Intellectual Property, 93 TEX. L. REV. 789, 804–13 (2015). 
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the contracting parties agree to work together toward an underspecified goal, with 
the idea of developing and applying new knowledge throughout the course of the 
collaboration.105 The contracts they describe to implement these arrangements do 
not set traditional terms like price and quantity, but rather specify the governance 
mechanisms that will enable the parties to build trust and collaborate over time.106 
 
2.  Competitive Strategy 
 
Entrepreneurial strategies, particularly in technology-based industries, are often 
described as problems of appropriability. That is, how do firms appropriate the gains 
from their investments in creating and exploiting entrepreneurial opportunities?107 
But the appropriability problem can also be cast as a problem of information 
management. Entrepreneurial firms need to determine the extent to which their 
competitive advantage derives from unique information and then to decide how to 
manage that information in such a way as to maintain the competitive advantage. 
There are at least two dimensions to this task. The first is figuring out how to 
monetize the firm’s innovation; how to use the information to generate revenue? 
Sometimes this is straightforward, as with sales of a new product; other times, it is 
more complicated, as when, for example, a firm may choose to earn revenue through 
licensing or to use a new process to gain an advantage in manufacturing an old 
product. The second dimension concerns the firm’s position in the competitive 
environment. The firm’s monetization strategy depends in no small part on the ease 
with which competitors may enter and compete, on the industrial organization of the 
relevant industry, and on the need to differentiate itself on the basis of any number 
of factors.  
All of these decisions turn in some part on the degree to which the firm’s core 
information assets may be transferred—willingly or unwillingly—in the competitive 
environment. Some information assets are self-revealing; once they are released into 
the world, competitors can immediately glean the relevant information and begin 
competition.108 The design of a paper clip, for example, can be gleaned simply from 
observation. Others require more expensive reverse engineering (or may be 
impossible to reverse engineer—the formula for Coca-Cola is the canonical 
example).  
Now return to the examples from the early and late telephone industry with 
which this Article began. Bell’s telephone system was easily copied.109 The industry 
in which he was competing was marked by a large monopolist in a position to 
appropriate the technology and implement it (or suppress it) entirely on its own. In 
                                                
105 See Ronald J. Gilson et al., Contracting for Innovation: Vertical Disintegration and 
Interfirm Collaboration, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 494 (2009). 
106 See id. at 457–58. 
107 See Teece, supra note 35, at 287. 
108 See Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get? Experimental Use and the 
Patent Bargain, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 81, 104–18. 
109 Indeed, as described above, it was simultaneously invented by more than just one 
person. See supra notes 1–6 and accompanying text. 
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that context, Bell’s IP-based exclusion strategy made some sense. Vonage, by 
contrast, operated in a vastly different competitive environment. IP-based telephony 
protocols were not easily copied but were also poor fits for IP protection, because 
they could be designed around. Putting aside the IP threats from incumbent carriers, 
Vonage operated in a space in which network effects and first-mover advantages 
rather than IP were the primary drivers of appropriability. IP here was a hindrance 
rather than a help.  
The point here is not to map all of the circumstances or factors that may bear 
on firms’ competitive information management decisions. It is instead simply to 
highlight the fact that such decisions are complex and context-specific. 
 
3.  Fundraising 
 
Entrepreneurial startups need cash. Once they have exhausted friends and 
family, personal credit cards, and other such readily available sources, they need to 
access capital markets. And to do so, in turn, requires information exchange similar 
to that described above. Indeed, in fundraising the challenge may be even greater. 
On one hand, entrepreneurial firms need to communicate about their assets and 
business plans with potential sources of capital. This raises the same disclosure 
paradox problems as product development.110 But there is moral hazard on the other 
side of the relationship as well, as venture capitalists must be sufficiently confident 
ex ante that their portfolio companies will not simply take their money and run. 
Robert Cooter refers to this as the “double trust dilemma.”111 Again, the mechanisms 
that entrepreneurs and investors utilize to overcome this dilemma are varied and 
context-specific. But they tend to focus on the effects of reputation. Venture 
capitalists are repeat players in the market for startups, just as many entrepreneurs 
themselves engage in serial business building.112 
 
* * * 
 
Of course, these three spheres of activity are not completely independent. They 
overlap and interact in complex ways. The discussion to this point has focused on 
functions rather than actors. But it is often the case that entrepreneurs, their 
development partners, and their sources of financing engage in several of these 
activities at the same time. Venture capitalists, for instance, often occupy seats on 
the boards of directors of startups they invest in. In that capacity, they are responsible 
not only for funding, but also for aspects of product development and strategic 
planning. Entrepreneurs similarly wear multiple hats. And there are often other 
                                                
110 See supra notes 97–108 and accompanying text. 
111 ROBERT D. COOTER & HANS-BERND SCHÄFER, SOLOMON’S KNOT: HOW LAW CAN 
END THE POVERTY OF NATIONS 27 (2012) (ebook) (“To develop an innovation, the innovator 
must trust the investor not to steal his idea, and the investor must trust the innovator not to 
steal his capital.”). 
112 See Burstein, supra note 40, at 270. 
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actors involved in entrepreneurial ventures—universities, for example. Together, 
these actors playing multiple roles make up entrepreneurial communities capable of 
at least rough definition. Indeed, entrepreneurial communities are often 
characterized by the presence of networks of individuals all engaged in various 
forms of information sharing.113 And these networks are often localized in particular 
geographies. Silicon Valley and Cambridge, Massachusetts, for example, are well-
known “innovation clusters.”114 In such clusters, industry, government, academia, 
and finance co-locate in ways that facilitate communication and collaboration. These 
environments tend to be rich in entrepreneurial activity and are often referred to as 
“ecosystems.”115  
That parallelism with the original source of institutional commons research is 
telling. Entrepreneurial activity, as described above, is in many ways similar to the 
management of a natural resource commons. Entrepreneurial communities engage 
in the production and management of new information and knowledge. Indeed, that 
is at the core of entrepreneurial activity. And they do so through varied and context-
specific institutional mechanisms that include, but are not limited to intellectual 
property. The relationship between IP and entrepreneurship is therefore much 
different from the way in which it has traditionally been portrayed in the legal 
literature on innovation.  
At this point, it is worth pausing to address a couple of related objections to 
characterizing entrepreneurial activity as a commons. The first is rhetorical. It may 
seem incongruous at best to describe entrepreneurial ventures in the same breath as, 
say, Wikipedia. 116  And if entrepreneurship can be modeled as an instance of 
commons governance, cannot the same thing be said of big corporations? Is Pfizer 
a commons?117 The second is practical: how much room is there for commons-style 
sharing in a profit-making enterprise? Because profit emerges only from private 
goods that are rivalrous and excludable, how can profit-seeking entities sustainably 
support commons governance?  
Both objections can be answered by recognizing that a “commons” “does not 
denote the resources, the community, a place, or a thing.” 118  It is instead “the 
institutional arrangement of those elements” to create a “form of community 
management or governance.”119 It is a set of institutionalized mechanisms for the 
production and management of a particular resource—in this case, information. The 
                                                
113 See, e.g., Walter W. Powell et al., Interorganizational Collaboration and the Locus 
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114 See SAXENIAN, supra note 17, at 1–4. 
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2014. 
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governance of that resource is conceptually separable from the goals of the 
participants. Commons governance is, in other words, a means rather than an end. 
And commons-based information management is consistent with a wide variety of 
ends, including profit-making ends. Consider, for example, that the open-source 
software community—long the poster child for commons-based production120—
includes profit-making entities like Red Hat, a provider of services for users of open-
source software, that have built successful business models around sustainable 
commons management. Or consider the many user-innovation communities that 
exchange information in the course of amateur pursuits but eventually spawn profit-
making entrepreneurial entities to implement at a larger scale many of the user 
innovations generated by the commons.121  
 
IV.  CONCLUSION: STUDYING THE ENTREPRENEURIAL COMMONS 
 
Reconceptualizing entrepreneurial activity as a knowledge commons leads us 
to ask a different set of questions than previous studies have, and to utilize a different 
set of methodological tools. As Part II described, existing approaches to 
understanding the relationship between IP and entrepreneurship focus on the firm 
and its reactions to various IP laws. By contrast, to the extent that the exemplar 
entrepreneurial activities described in Part III can be described as instances of 
commons governance, the analysis must necessarily be broader. The knowledge 
commons framework forces us to acknowledge that much of information production 
and dissemination depends on relationships among individuals and their interactions 
with the background competitive environment and the legal and market factors that 
shape it.  
Frischmann and his collaborators articulate a standard set of questions for 
investigating knowledge commons that should prove readily adaptable to the study 
of the entrepreneurial commons. They ask about:122  
 
• The background environment—the legal and cultural context in which 
the activity exists; and the “default” IP status of the relevant resources. 
Here, the evidence so far suggests much variation. The “default” IP status 
of any given information resource, for example, tends to be industry-
specific.123 The background legal and cultural context tends to vary with 
geography.124 
 
• The attributes of the resources at issue, the community members, and 
the goals and objectives of the various parties. Here, the analysis will focus 
                                                
120 See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm, 
112 YALE L.J. 369, 371–81 (2002); see also Frischmann et al., supra note 18, at 3–4. 
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on the business. What is the technology? Who is involved? What are their 
goals and objectives? The traditional analysis of IP and entrepreneurship 
elides much of this detail. It assumes a single company and asks how that 
company responds to externally set rules. The knowledge commons 
framework instead broadens the analysis to include a wider variety of 
actors who influence the course of entrepreneurial activity. This in turn 
enables more fine-grained analysis of the mechanisms of information 
management. 
 
• The governance of the commons—the spheres of activity and the 
formal and informal rules, norms, and decision makers that govern that 
activity; and finally about the patterns and outcomes of the activity.125 This 
set of questions focuses on the interactions among diverse community 
members outlined above. It focuses on how information actually is 
produced and managed without biasing the analysis in the first instance 
through a focus on intellectual property. IP may well be important in many 
settings; in others it may be of little importance; and, more likely, it plays 
a nuanced role alongside other rules, norms, and decisions. 
 
• Patterns and outcomes—what benefits are delivered to participants; 
what are the costs and risks associated with commons management? 
 
Methodologically, these questions are best answered in the context of a case 
study. Ostrom’s and Frischmann’s groups rely primarily on qualitative, 
ethnographic studies of particular communities. That methodology allows for deep 
exploration of the questions posed above. In particular, case studies will help to 
surface the multiple strategies that entrepreneurial firms utilize to manage 
information sharing—including those that utilize IP in various ways, and those that 
do not. Although it is of course difficult to generalize from any single case study, 
the accumulation of such studies can lead to generalizable results.  
Framing the relationship between intellectual property and entrepreneurship in 
the terms described above leads both to a positive and normative research agenda. 
As a descriptive matter, there is much to be gained from systematically studying 
these questions in a variety of different contexts. Indeed, a fuller picture of the 
relationship requires numerous case studies of different firms and different 
industries. From this descriptive knowledge base, normative conclusions about 
changes to our intellectual property laws and rules that would benefit entrepreneurs 
can more readily and justifiably be drawn. 
                                                
125 See id. at 7. 
